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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RANDY SMITH,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

]
. .• ]

vs.

i

LINDA K. JACOBSON SMITH,

Case No. 14695

]

Defendant and
Respondent

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
In general, respondent agrees with appellant's brief in
the statement of facts and the citation of the law.

However, the

emphasis of appellant's brief interprets both the facts and the
cases in a light most favorable to his point of view, seeking a
substitution of the Supreme Court's judgment for that of the
trial court.

This court has reiterated many times, in countless

ways, that upon review the facts will be regarded most favorably
for the respondent with due respect for the opportunity of the
trier of the facts to observe the witnesses, even in equity cases,
Cox v. Cox. 532 P.2d 994, (Utah, 1975).
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
The trial court, faced with the dilemma of deciding which
of two acceptable parents should he awarded custody of two III tie
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children, ordered home evaluation reports from the Division of
Family Services of the State Department of Social Services
(R. 57, 6 1 ) , observed and heard each parent and their new spouses,
and interviewed in chambers the older of the two children.
The Smiths have a monthly income of $1296 (R. 5 9 ) .
Moores have a monthly income of $1380.

Both homes were

The

recommended

as adequate in all respects by the Department of Social Services.
In a memorandum decision, the judge struggled with the
agony of Solomon's

M

understanding heart'1 to reach the conclusion

that the children should be in the custody of their natural mother:
This is probably the most difficult case the Court
has been called upon to decide. The issue presented
is the custody of two children born to two loving
parents each of whom wants the privilege of nurturing
and training these children. The daughter is an
attractive, bright, well-adjusted girl and I have
every reason to believe that the boy is or will be
just as charming. The Court has to decide whether
their overall interests will be best served by
remaining in the father's household or whether the
children's best interests will be served by placing
them with their natural mother. The father's household, where the children now are, has two older
children living there. The father works a night shift
for the Ogden Police Department. The mother in that
household is a very loving person, but I think that
even she would concede that where the homes are
otherwise equal, the natural mother has the edge.
There is the added consideration that the mother and
her present husband, by the acquisition of the new
home, have properly positioned themselves to care for
these children. Within the next few years, the question
of having her own bedroom will become more and more
important to Kirsten. Her training through the years
of puberty, it seems to me, will come easy through her
natural mother. I conclude therefore that custody
should go to the mother with liberal visitation rights
of the father which are to include extended visitation
rights during summer vacation from school. (R. 68)
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In making this decision, the judge was presented with
the mind-boggling speed of disruption in modern family relationships.
On August 10th, 1975, Randy Smith, the appellant, informed his wife,
Linda, that he wanted a divorce (Tr. 49, R* 134). On August 28th,
Linda met with Randy's attorney and signed a Consent and Waiver
to a Divorce Complaint which sought to deprive her of the custody
of her children (R. 6 ) . Although the trial court found that
there was no duress or coercion involved in the signing of the
stipulation (R. 6 9 ) , Linda testified that she was at the time not
"concerned about the papers" (Tr. 48; R. 133) but "mostly
the kids and my health."
{Jr.

[about]

Forty days later, on October 10th, 1975,

173; R. 258; cf. typographical error in Findings, R. 71)

Randy married Vickie, who was divorced and maintaining a home for
her two children, Tracy, 14, and Jo Ann, 12.

Tracy testified in

behalf of his new stepfather:
I have had three dads, and he is the best one I
have had...(Tr. 167; R. 2 5 2 ) .
Twenty-one days after the Smith marriage, on November 1, 1975,
Linda married another Randy...Randy Moore.

She immediately began

proceedings to regain custody of the children, with a Petition to
vacate and set aside the Divorce, but the matter was not disposed
of until June 23, 1976, upon a Petition to Modify.
Counsel for Plaintiff-appellant, Randy Smith, urged
that the petition was inadequate in that it did not allege the
conclusion of changed conditions (Tr. 6, R. 91) but the lower
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court pointed out that Paragraph 3 alleged that the defendant
(Linda Smith) "is now married and is better qualified..."
Counsel for both parties were confused by the rapid change of
marriage partners, causing plaintiff's counsel to agree that a
remarriage would be a material change of circumstances sufficient
to support modification of the Decree (Tr. 6, R. 91 K
POINT I
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CONDITIONS TO SUPPORT A
MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE.
Respondent agrees with the statement of Appellant's
Point I that modification of divorce decree necessitates showing
of substantial change of conditions,

but wishes to refute the

implication that no such showing was here made.
Linda Smith was naturally shocked and panic-stricken by
the sudden demand of her husband for a divorce (R. 58; Tr. 50, R. 135)
she was sick at the time (Tr. 50, R. 135) and was making less
money than was appellant (Tr. 45, R. 130). Within three months
these conditions had changed and she petitioned to set aside the
decree.

She had remarried, her health had improved, she and her

husband were buying a house, the combined income in her new family
was $1380 as compared to $1296 earned by her former husband and
Except perhaps in a case like the present one, obtained
upon default where the issues of custody and finances have not
been litigated. See Lahart v. Lahart, 13 Wash. App. 452, P.2d 145
(1975) where the court held that a showing of change of circumstances
is not necessary in such a case.
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his new wi fe e
The court was entitled to consider all of these factors
in determining a change of child custody.

The case of Robinson v.

Robinson. 15 Utah 2d 293, 391 P.2d 434 (1964) cited by appellant
was a case where the Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial
court's denial of an order to change custody where the children
had been in the home of the father for four or five years and
were happy and well-adjusted.
As we have often observed, on appeal it is advisable
to allow considerable latitude of discretion to the
trial court in such matters because of his advantaged
position to judge the personalities and characters of
those involved. See Sartain v. Sartain, 15 Utah 2d 198,
389, P.2d 1023. In doing so here we are not persuaded
that he abused his discretion nor that the order should
be reversed. 391 P.2d at 436.
In the instant case, the children cannot be said to have
put down permanent roots.

Economic advantages and more individual

attention in the smaller family are
change.

available through the ordered

In addition, the children of tender years will be in

the home of their natural mother.

These considerations led the

trial court to its difficult decision and there is neither allegation
nor evidence of an abuse of the court's discretion.
POINT II
WIFE HAS NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO CUSTODY OF MINORS UNDER
TEN YEARS OF AGE; BUT TRIAL COURT IS COMPELLED TO GIVE SERIOUS
WEIGHT TO THE NEED OF YOUNG CHILDREN FOR THEIR NATURAL MOTHER.
Respondent has no argument to make against the proposition
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that the mother is not invariably and always entitled to custody
under the presumption of U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-10, and that the
paramount objective

of a custody action is to provide for the

welfare of the children, Johnson v. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323
P.2d 16 (1958),

In Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 99k (1975) the Supreme

Court made its most recent delineation of the rule to answer
this often-challenged concept in child-custody cases:
In addition to and quite beyond the rights of the
parents, there is the important principle that the
paramount consideration is the 1ong-term welfare
and adjustment of the children. That being so,
we think there is wisdom in the traditional
patterns of thought that the roles of the mother
and father in the family are such that, all things
being comparatively equal, the children should be
in the care of their mother, especially so children
of younger years; and that this may be true even
where the divorce is granted to the father.
532 P.2d at 996.
POINT II I
MODIFICATION OF A DIVORCE DECREE BY CHANGING CUSTODY OF
CHILDREN IS NOT A USURPATION OF APPELLATE POWER BUT A NECESSARY,
CONTINUING AND SANCTIONED POWER OF THE DISTRICT COURTS.
The award of custody of children is not permanent, but
may be subsequently modified when changing times and circumstances
dictate a custodial change to comport with the best interests and
welfare of the child and the parties involved, Mecham v. Mecham,
Skk P.2d 479 (Utah, 1975).
U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-5 provides in part:
...The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to
make such subsequent changes or new orders with
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respect to the support and maintenance of the parties,
the custody of the children and their support and
maintenance, or the distribution of the property as
shall be reasonable and necessary...
The cases of Harward v. Harward and Peterson v. Peterson
cited by Appellant are inapplicable to the instant case and the
argument is completely without merit,
CONCLUSION
The trial court gave careful, concerned attention to
every available consideration involved in this action and determined
that the children involved should be living with their natural
mother.

There is no evidence of abuse of discretion and the

judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

V~J?
fUSSELL J. HADLEY
Attorney for Respondent"
70 East South Temple
P.O. Box 1765
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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